Federal law bans the broadcasting of "any ... indecent ... language," 18 U. S. C. §1464, which includes references to sexual or excretory activity or organs, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 . Having first defined the prohibited speech in 1975, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) took a cautious, but gradually expanding, approach to enforcing the statutory prohibition. In 2004, the FCC's Golden Globes Order declared for the first time that an expletive (nonliteral) use of the F-Word or the S-Word could be actionably indecent, even when the word is used only once.

        This case concerns isolated utterances of the F- and S-Words during two live broadcasts aired by Fox Television Stations, Inc. In its order upholding the indecency findings, the FCC, inter alia, stated that the Golden Globes Order eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be actionable; declared that under the new policy, a lack of repetition weighs against a finding of indecency, but is not a safe harbor; and held that both broadcasts met the new test because one involved a literal description of excrement and both invoked the F-Word. The order did not impose sanctions for either broadcast. The Second Circuit set aside the agency action, declining to address the constitutionality of the FCC's action but finding the FCC's reasoning inadequate under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

After the State discredited petitioner Cone's defense that he killed two people while suffering from acute psychosis caused by drug addiction, he was convicted and sentenced to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and the state courts denied postconviction relief. Later, in a second petition for state postconviction relief, Cone raised the claim that the State had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 , by suppressing witness statements and police reports that would have corroborated his insanity defense and bolstered his case in mitigation of the death penalty. The postconviction court denied him a hearing on the ground that the Brady claim had been previously determined, either on direct appeal or in earlier collateral proceedings. The State Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Cone then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. That Court denied relief, holding the Brady claim procedurally barred because the state courts' disposition rested on adequate and independent state grounds: Cone had waived it by failing to present his claim in state court. Even if he had not defaulted the claim, ruled the court, it would fail on its merits because none of the withheld evidence would have cast doubt on his guilt. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the latter conclusion, but considered itself barred from reaching the claim's merits because the state courts had ruled the claim previously determined or waived under state law.

Respondent Donnie Ray Ventris and Rhonda Theel were charged withmurder and other crimes. Prior to trial, an informant planted in Ventris's cell heard him admit to shooting and robbing the victim, but Ventris testified at trial that Theel committed the crimes. When the State sought to call the informant to testify to his contradictory statement, Ventris objected. The State conceded that Ventris's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had likely been violated, but argued that the statement was admissible for impeachment purposes. The trial court allowed the testimony. The jury convicted Ventris of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. Reversing, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the informant's statements were not admissible for any reason, including impeachment.

Held: Ventris's statement to the informant, concededly elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment , was admissible to impeach his inconsistent testimony at trial. Pp. 3-7.

An individual convicted for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any violent or drug trafficking crime, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of such a crime, receives a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence, in addition to the punishment for the underlying crime. 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A)(i). The mandatory minimum increases to 7 years "if the firearm is brandished" and to 10 years "if the firearm is discharged." §§924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).

        Petitioner Dean was convicted of conspiring to commit a bank robbery and discharging a firearm during an armed robbery. Because the firearm was "discharged" during the robbery, Dean was sentenced to a 10-year mandatory minimum prison term on the firearm count. §924(c)(1)(A)(iii). On appeal, he contended that the discharge was accidental, and that §924(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires proof that the defendant intended to discharge the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that no proof of intent is required.

Held: Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires no separate proof of intent. The 10-year mandatory minimum applies if a gun is discharged in the course of a violent or drug trafficking crime, whether on purpose or by accident. Pp. 2-9.

A few years ago, Safford Middle School in Safford, Ari- zona, adopted a policy prohibiting the "nonmedical use, pos- session, or sale of drugs on school property or at school events." The term "drugs" is defined by the policy as includ- ing, but not limited to: (1) "[a]ll dangerous controlled sub- stances prohibited by law," (2) "[a]ll alcoholic beverages," and (3) "[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which permission to use in school has been grant- ed." Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears that the school implemented this policy in response to a prior incident, in which a student brought a prescription drug to school and distributed it to classmates, one of whom became seriously ill and was hospitalized.¹

The  reports:

The Supreme Court issued two rulings on Monday concerning the consequences of long delays in the criminal justice system.

In one, the court declined to hear an appeal from a death row inmate who argued that he should not be executed because the 32 years he spent on death row amounted to cruel and unusual punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment. The court's decision not to hear the case touched off a lively debate among three justices.

The court also ruled that a Vermont man's right to a speedy trial had not been violated despite a three-year delay.

When the court accepted the speedy-trial case, Vermont v. Brillon, No. 08-88, it appeared to be ready to decide whether delays by court-appointed lawyers provided by the state may sometimes amount to a violation of the right. The ordinary rule is that only the prosecution's delays count against the government.

Click read more to read the Vermont v. Brillon opinion.

 For decades, journalists have been guided by what most considered an absolute defense to libel lawsuits: If a news report is true, it can't be libelous.

But a recent decision by a federal appeals court in Boston is calling that ironclad defense into question and creating an outcry from news organizations and bloggers worried it could make reporters hesitant to touch certain stories.

Read Noonan by clicking on read more.

The following are opinons from the Tennessee Supreme Court for the Second Quarter of 2009.

The are decisions for 2009 from the Tennessee Supreme Court, Workers' Compensation Panel.

Decisions from the Tennessee Court of Appeals for the 2nd Quarter of 2009.